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Document Type

Full Length Article

Abstract

The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is a natural law principle attributed to Thomas Aquinas that is supposed to offer insight on whether an act is morally permissible or not. It also seeks to make a moral distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. In this paper, I argue that we should reject DDE because it does not allow a person to intend harm even in situations where it seems to be morally justifiable. It also fails at making a distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Because of this, the conditions of DDE seem to be implausible.

Academic Department

Philosophy

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License.

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